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ln the Supre01e Court of the 
State of Utah 
WILMA W. WOO'ITON, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. CASE 
COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY )I NO. 10108 
OF AMERICA. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondent adopts appellant's statement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent adopts appellant's statement. 
STATEMENT OF FAc.r8 
The respondent believes that the appellant's statement 
of facts is substantially correct. The respondent, however, 
would add that the insurance agent, Mr. Bowen, was a 
long time friend and acquaintance of the decedent and was 
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well aware of his condition and physical disability. (R. 31) 
(Bowen Dep. P. 9) 
The respondent would further add that a full premium 
including the added cost for the accidental death rider was 
paid by the respondent. (R. 17) Another salient fact is 
that at the time of making the application, September 24, 
1962, the respondent did not know (and does not now know, 
if such is the case) that her husband, Harold, had ever 
seen Dr. C. M. Smith, Jr. prior to the date of application. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD DISCLOSES NO GENUINE ISSUE 
OF MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THIS CONDITION 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is apparently the position of the appellant that so 
long as there is a material issue of fact, summary judg-
ment cannot be granted. The appellant's entire brief is 
related to the fact question as distinguished from the law 
question. Although we do not admit that there is a ma-
terial issue of fact and, on the contrary, believe that there 
is no substantial or material issue of fact, the respondent 
respectfully contends that the respondent is entitled to 
judgment on the pleadings. A summary perusal of the 
answer shows that the only defense raised by the appel-
lant is that it was "induced to enter into the insurance 
contract with plaintiff and plaintiff's deceased husband by 
reason of intentional misrepresentation of materials facts 
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Fraud is the only basis upon which the appellant can 
be relieved of its obligation under the policy. The appel-
lant has completely and utterly failed to plead fraud with 
the pruticularity required by the statute. Rule 9 (b) ~ 
quires fraud and the circumstances of fraud to be pleaded 
\fith particularity. This has not been done. See A. W. 
Sewell v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, 80 
Utah 37H: 15 Pac 2d., 327; Davis Stock Company v. Hill, 
2 Utah 2d, 20; 268 Pac 2d, 988. 
In this respect, the Court will note that the appellant 
has failed to plead that the misrepresentation, if one was 
made. \Vas relied upon. The appellant has failed to allege 
\vith particularity the circumstances of the said fraud, set-
ting forth the alleged ·misrepresentation and pleading the 
rnateriaHty or reliance upon said representation. The 
Davis case states that the materiality of the allegations 
must be alleged in the pleading with certainty; otheTWise, 
there is no raising of the issue of fraud. The Davis case 
also states that the materiality of. a false representation 
cannot be ascertained unless the true f:act is alleged with 
particularity. Here the appellant has failed to allege the 
tnte fact which it supposedly relies upon. See Stuck v. 
Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah, 495; 227 Pac. 
791. The last citation sets forth the elements of an ane-
gation in fraud necessary to be pleaded under the Utah 
Statutes. The Court will note that the appellant has failed . 
to make an allegation in fraud sufficient to give it a de-
f<-'nse. 
Even assuming the pleadings were sufficient to state 
a claim. the respondent respectfully contends that notwith-
standing the arguments made in appellant's Point I, there 
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could not possibly be a misrepresentation. The language 
of the application is clear. Appellant contends that the 
misrepresentation was made in respondent's answer to ques-
tions 5, 6 and 7. These questions and answers are specifi-
cally set forth as follows: 
5. Have you or any f-amily dependent members, :ever 
had or received medical advice or treatment for 
(circle condition Answer Yes if yes to .any part of 
5) 
(f) Any other sickness, injury or defect? (Give 
Name) 
.Harold-Polio at .age ·of 3 Yes 
·6. If Yes to any part of question 5, complete the fol-
lowitlg for ·each circled condition: 
Person-A-Polio at age of 3 yrs. Has slight.lim.p. 
Still under doctors .care?-No. 
Name and address of doctor who was in attendance 
Dr. is deceaSed. 
Complete Recover-No Recurrence 
7. To the .best of your knowledge are you and all.fam-
Uy dependent members now in good health and 
free from any physical defect injury or disease 
and are not now under medical care? Yes. 
The language and handwriting was that of the agent 
and not of the applicant or the insured. The claimed mis-
representation appears to be that the application said that 
Harold Wootton had polio at the .age of three, that he had 
a slight limp resulting ·therefrom and that he had completely 
recovered from the said condition. 
'11he .appellant finds the inconsistency of the answer 
to queStiori' 6 a "misrepresentation." We respectfully .say 
that where the insw~nce ·company was infonned that the 
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insw·ed had been afflicted with polio, that he had recovered 
but that the polio had left him with a limp, to further say 
in the same sentence that he was in good heal~h and free 
from physical defect is not a misrepresentation. 
The fact is that the company and its agent were com-
pletely informed as to the limitation of the insured. It 
was for this reason that they attached a rider to the policy 
eliminating coverage from "poliomyelitus or residual paTa-
lysis" and stamped the policy on the face of it, in red, 
··NOTICE! SEE ELIMINATION RIDER ATrACHED TO 
TillS POLICY". 
1,he appellanrt does not contend by its Point I, its 
pleading or its argument that Mrs. Wootton, tJhe applicant, 
kne\v, if such were the case, that Mr. Wootton had been 
to see a Dr. Smith in July of 1962. It does not contend 
that she made any intentional misrepresentation of fact. 
It admitted in its argument to the trial court that they had 
no evidence that she knew of any limitation of her hus-
band, other than the polio mentioned in the application. 
The depositions taken by the appellant fail to show any 
knowledge on the part of Mrs. Wootton different than that 
sho\\rn in the application. There could not, therefore, be 
any misrepresentation by the applicant. 
The appellant at no time talked with the decedent con-
cerning his disability or condition of health. It is also in-
teresting to note that the insurance company never made 
any effort to contact the decedent concerning his health 
or knmvn disability. It would seem that the appellant 
should be estopped from claiming misrepresentation under 
these circumstances . 
. L\uthorities that establish that ambiguities in an in-
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surance contract are to be construed against the insurance 
company: 
-29 Am. Jur 640 to 650 and Sec. 258 to 264. 
Gressler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah 182, 163 
P2d 374. 
Browing v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 72 P2d 
1060, 94 Utah 532. 
Richards v. Standard Accid. Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 58 
Utah 622. 
POINT IT 
STATEMENTS MADE IN AN APPLICATION FOR 
INSURANCE ARE REPRESENTATIONS NOT WAR-
RANTIES. 
Utah Code Annotated 31-22-1(4): 
"A provision that the policy shall constitute the entire 
contract between the parties and that all statements 
made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud, 
be deemed representations and not warranties and that 
no such statement or statemeents shall- be used in de-
fense of a claim under_ the policy unless contained in 
a vmtten application therefor and a copy of such appli-
cation shall be endorsed upon or attached to the policy 
when issued." 
Because appellant has cited the last sentence of the 
first para~aph of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 31-19-8, 
we deem it necessary that the entire provision be cUed: 
"31-19-8. Materiality of misrepresentations - Warran-
ties - Presumptions and burden of proof. - (1) Except 
as provided in subsection (2), no oral or written mis-
representation or warranty made in the negotiation of 
an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf, 
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the con-
tract or prevent it attaching, unless such misrepresen· 
tation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive. 
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The insured shall have the burden of proof that 
such misrepresentation or warranty was not made with 
intent to deceive. 
(2) In any application for life or disability in-
surance made in writing by the insured, all statements 
therein made by the insured shall, in the absence of 
fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties. 
The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the 
right to recovery under the contract unless it mate-
rially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the 
hazard assumed by tlhe insurer. 
As argued in Point I, we believe that it is obvious 
that there was and could be no misrepresentation under 
the application. This is especially true in light of the In-
terrogatories and Ans\vers. (R. 9, 13) 
"2. State in detail the misrepresentation of material 
facts alleged in paragraph 7 of tlhe answer, and in this 
regard set forth who made the misrepresentation, how 
it was made, when it was made, and before whom it 
was made. 
A. It \vas represented by plaintiff that the only sick-
ness,, injury or defect of the deceased was that he had 
polio at the age of three years, that he had a slight 
limp at that time, that there was no recurrence of any 
difficulty, and that there had been a complete recovery 
from said condition. It was further represented that 
the deceased was not at that time under any doctor's 
care for such condition. Said representations were 
made by plaintiff, were made orally and in writing, 
made on September 24, 1962, and were made in the 
presence of \Veston Cordner and Albert Bowen. 
3. State in what way the representation made did 
not conform with the tn1th. 
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A. On July 13, 1962, the deceased was seen by Dr. 
Charles M. Smith, Jr., of Pro~o, Utah. The doctor 
found that there was an increasing weakness in the 
left leg and greatly diminished muscle power. Prior 
to this time, the deceased .had noticed a great tendency 
for falling. The doctor advised him that because of 
this continuous falling, he should re·tire from his oc-
cupation. This the deceased did in July, 1962, for 
the reason that his leg was continually causing him 
trouble." 
The answer to Interrogatory 2 indicates that the ap-
pellant is relying partially on an oral representation. This 
cannot be a basis f.or defense under Utah Code Annotated 
31-22-1(4) cited above. 
If the appellant is relying on a written representation, 
then it must be the answer to question 6 of the application 
(R .. 17) which is partially set forth under A. 2 above. If 
this. is. so, and there can be no other conclusion under these 
interrogatories and answers, then there could be no mis-
representation for A. 3 sets forth the alleged true fact. Let 
us analyze the claimed misrepresentation as compared to 
the claimed trurtJh. 
Representation A. 2 Truth A. 3 
1. Polio at age 3 1. Not denied 
2. Had a slight limp 2. Nort denied 
3. No recurrence of diffi- 3. Not denied 
culty (polio) 
4. Had been complete re- 4. Not denied 
oovery from condition 
(polio) 
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Th(' appellant's answer number 3 does not negate any 
of the represPntations claimed Wlder Answer number 2. 
It only adds some superfluous allegations, to-wit: 
(1) That the deceased had seen Dr. Charles M. 
Smith, Jr., on July 13, 1962. This does not impugn the 
answers to the application. Suppose he had. It does not 
pro\rt .. that he, on September 24, 1962, was under and doc-
tor's care or that the applicant, Mrs. Wootton, knew that 
he \Vas, or even that she knew he had seen the doctor on 
that date. if he did. 
(2) That he had a tendency for falling. This was 
knO\vn to the insurance company on September 24, 1962. 
They knew he had a defective leg and limped. Bowen knew 
he had this physical disabiliy. (R. 31) 
(3) That the doctor advised him to retire ·because of 
his tendency to fall. This he did in July, 1962. This was 
before the application. What difference did it make to the 
appellant \Vhy he ·retired. Mrs. Wootton in her deposition 
explained \vhy he retired. (R. 32, Wootton Dep. P. 14) 
It is obvious that there was no misrepresentation. For 
sake of argument, even if there was, how could anything 
therein represented be deemed material, fraudulent or have 
materiality affected the acceptance of risk or hazard as-
sumed by the company? 
POINT ill 
UNDER THE UTAH STA TIJTE, AN INSURER, IN 
ORDER TO A VOID ... ~ POLICY ON GROUNDS OF 
FALSE STATEMENT OR MISREPRESENTATIONS, 
MUST SHOW THAT SAID STATEMENTS WERE MA-
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TERIAL AND THAT THEY WERE MADE KNOWINGLY 
AND WITH INTE·NT TO DECEIVE OR DEFRAUD. 
In this case, the application for rthe policy was filled 
out by the agent in his handwriting setting down the an-
swers to questions asked by him and answered by Mrs. 
Wootton. See deposition of Albert Bowen, page 7. (R. 
31) On page 8 of that deposition, he testifies as follows: 
· "Q. · Now, in respect to No. 6, Question No. 6, what 
was the purpose of this notation? The notation is: 
'Polio ~at age three years, has slight limp. Not under 
doctor's care. And the doctor is deceased. Com-
plete recxwery. No recurrence.' What was your un-
derstanding of that phrase? 
A. Well, we wanted to let the Company know that 
Harold walked with a limp, and the reason he walked 
with a limp is because he had polio when he was 
younger, but that his poUo had not recurred and that 
he was fully recovered, other than the limp. 
Q. By 'fully recovered' did you mean whether he then 
had polio that was wocking on him, or if the polio had 
ceased to be active? 
A. I meant that the polio had ceased to be active. 
It wasn't borthering him any more now than it had for 
the rest of his life. 
Q. But you knew he had polio that had caused a liini-
tation in his physical ability? 
A. Yes. I never knew why he limped unrtil she an-
swered this question under 5 (f), that he had had 
polio. As long as I had known him he had Umped. And 
she said he had had it at age three. 
Q.· Did you tell her there would be any reduction in 
coverage because of that in the policy? 
A. We didn't know if the Company at this time 
would exclude polio or not. This is always up to the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
company. They can usually charge an additional pre-
mium and cover it if they want. But the policy came 
back with an exclusion of polio. 
"Q. Now, do you know of any representation or state-
ment to you that was in fact false? 
A. No. We asked the questions on the application. 
I asked the questions on the application just as they 
are written there, and we answered them just as she 
gave us the answers. And I am aware that the ap-
plication becomes a part of the policy, and so it has 
to be as right as it can be. 
Q. Well, as far as you know are there any false state-
ments in that application? 
A. No, there isn't any that I know about. Every 
question that is here 1:hat has been asked has been 
answered truthfully.'' 
After looking at the deposition Of Mr. Bowen and the 
particular extracts cited above, we refer the Court to the 
deposition of Mrs. Wootton. The particular portions of 
the depositions we believe are pertinent to the defendant's 
contention are: 
"Q. Well, do you know whether he saw a doctor with-
in a year prior to the time of his death or prior to the 
time this was signed? 
A. I don't know. I am sure he - ·he seen a doctor. 
I don't know how to answer a question like that. I 
don't honestly know if he seen doctors or not. I go 
to the doctor without telling him. I have went to the 
doctor withoot telling 1him I had been to a doctor. 
Q. Do you know that he saw Doctor Charles M. 
Smith, Jr., on July 13, 1962? 
A. I don't 
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Q. You don't even know that today? 
A. I ihave heard that he did since that time, yes. 
Q. When did Harold terminate his emplo~ent with 
the Provo River Water Users? 
A. In July. 
Q. Would that have been on July 15th? 
A. That he terminated? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I think it was July 15th. 
Q. W1hy did he terminate? 
A. Well, I don't exactly lmow why he terminated, 
other than the chang~over on the job up there. The 
job was too much for him. 
Q. Did you and 1he discuss it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you discuss why the job was too much for 
him? 
A. Yes. When he first went up there ,he had con-
trol o¥er the power house. That is all he had to do. 
And then they put him in charge of rthe chlorinating 
station ·and house cleaning and cutting the lawns. And 
in his condition he couldnt hold his end up. 
Q. You say, 'in his condition'. What was there about 
his condition? 
A. This condition existed then.'' 
The Court will recall that the application was made 
on September 24, 1962, and the premium paid. The in-
sured, Harold Wootton, died on December 31, 1962, as a 
result of injuries sustained in an automobile-pedestrian ac-
cident. The contention of the appellant is that the appli-
cation was false beeause on December 3, 1962, Mrs. Woot-
ton made a statement that her husband had been advised 
by Dr. Smith that "he might lose his good leg if he didn't 
stay off of it." Presumably, the insurance company be-
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lieve; that this statement is proof that she lmew at the 
time of the application that he had been to see a doctor 
and that his health was poor, or that his condition was bad, 
and that if she had been truthful, they would not have in-
sural. T'he respondent respectfully contends that this al-
legi.~ statement does not say that, and when read as stated 
in the deposition, says the absolute contrary. The stat~ 
n1ent is incapable of even suggesting the conclusion pro-
posed by the appellant. Mrs. Wootton's explanation of the 
ans\ver made to the insur'dllce claim questionaire an Jan-
uary 9, 1963, was based upon information that she had 
learned since the date of the application. See her deposi-
tion, page 13, line 19, (R. 32), as set forth above. This 
con1pletely refutes any suggestion that she ·had made an 
intentional misrepresentation. But even if it were inten-
tional, the respondent respectfully states that it was not 
material. 
The leading case in U·tah on this point is Chadwick 
v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 54 Utah, 443; 191 
P., 448. In this case, plaintiff, the insured's wife, was seek-
ing to collect the proceeds from a policy on the Hfe of her 
deceased husband. The insurance company admitted the 
allegations of the complaint but alleged rthat the deceased 
husband had made false and fraudulent statements in his 
aJlS\vers to questions asked in the application, to-wit: 
"Q. Give name and address of physician last consul-
ted. 
A. None. 
Q. Are you in gocxl health as far as you know or be-
lieve? 
A. Yes." 
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Testimony at the trial indicated that the husband was 
under a physician's care in Wyoming and that he was 
sufefring from severe back pain at this time. The trial 
court directed a verdict for the defendant insurance com-
pany. Plaintiff appealed. The ~Supreme Court, in its opin-
ion, had the following to say: 
"The issuance of a policy by the defendant was admit-
ted. The burden was on the defendant to void the 
poUcy by proving that it was procured b~ fraud It 
was not sufficient merely to prove that the deceased 
made false answers to questions propounded by the 
medical examiner. Irt was incumbent upon the defend-
ant to prove that the answers were not only untrue, 
but that the deceased knew or should have known 
them to be untrue. The question of good faith on the 
part of the insured by the defendant's answers is made 
the very gist of the controversy. Respectable author-
ity can be found maintaining the view that false state-
ments made ,and false answers given by the insured 
in his application for insurance concerning matte·rs ma-
terial to the risk will void the policy irrespective of 
the question of good faith or honest belief on the part 
of the insured, but as we have already shown when 
stating defendant't theory of the case, the issue here 
presented by the defendant is that the insured not 
only made false statements respecting his health at 
the time of applying for insurance and false answers 
relating thereto, but is alleged that at ·the vecy time 
he knew that they were false. In view of our statute 
and the cases we shall hereinafter cite, we are inclined 
to the view that in a case of this kind where an in-
surance company relies upon false statements and an-
swers of the insured as a defense against an action on 
the policy, it must not only allege, as the defendant has 
done in this case, that that statements and answers are 
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Wltrue, but also that the insured knew or should have 
known them to be untrue at the time he made them. 
Not only this, but as a necessary corollary in judicial 
proceedings the truth of such allegations should be 
substantially established at the trial." 
Another Utah case dealing with this point is New 
York Life Insurance Company v. Grow, 135 P. 2d, 120. 
Plaintiff insurance company in this case instituted an ac-
tion to cancel the policy because of false statements and 
misrepresentations made by the defendant's deceased ·hus-
band in his answers to questions concerning his medical 
history. Testimony at trial is replete with evidence that · 
the husband knew that he had a rheumatic heart condi-
tion and yet when questioned on such matter by the agent 
of the insurance company, he made no mention of this 
fact The Court said: 
"It was the burden of the plaintiff to esta!blish actual 
fraud on the part of insured that he made the mate-
rial misrepresentations shown by the application know-
ingly and with intent .to deceive and defraud the plain-
tiff insurance company. This it failed to do." 
The Court then quotes approval f.rom a case of Zolin-
takis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 97 F.2d, 583; 
108 F. 2d, 902. This was a case in the Federal Court which 
dealt with an interpretation of Utah Law concerning ma-
terial misrepresentations in an insurance applicatiOn. 
"By this decision Utah is committed to the liberal doc-
trine that before misrepresentations of material facts 
will void a policy of insurance, ·it must be established 
that they were not only knowingly made, but also wil-
fully and intentionally, with intent to deceive and de-
fraud." 
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See Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. 
Middlemiss, 135 P. 2d, 275. Here the Court made a defi-
nition of material representation: 
"A material representation is one which ordinarily 
would influence a prudent insurer in determining 
whether to accept oc reject one risk, or in fixing the 
amOWlt of premium in the event of such acceptance, 
or in excepting some risk or part thereof from cover-
age.'' 
Also quoting from the Zolintakis case above, the Court 
said: 
"A material fact is any fact, the knowledge or ignor-
ance of which would naturally influence the insurer's 
judgment in making the contract, in estimating the 
degree and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate 
of insurance." 
To void the policy the insurer must have relied on the 
misrepresentation. 
29 Am. Jur., 966, Section 705: 
"The rule that the intentional misrepresentation by the 
applicant of a material fact relied on by the insurer 
permits the latter to avoid the policy is not applicable 
where the insurer cannot be held to have relied there-
on, having had actual knowledge of the true facts or 
of the falsity of the applicant's statements, or at least 
sufficient indications that would have put a prudent 
man on notice and caused him to start an inquiry 
which, if carried out with reasonable thoroughness, 
would have revealed the truth. Thus, an insurer can-
not ~claim a misrepresentation as to facts of which he 
is fully informed, and if the expressions are ambig-
uous, the insurer should clear up the ambiguity by 
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asking for an explanation, and not by substituting its 
o\vn conjectures therefor." 
See New York Life Insurence Company v. Strudel, 
243 F. 2d. 90, where it is said that the general rule is: 
"That the intentional misrepresentations by an appli-
cant of a matetial fact relied on by the insurer, the 
latter to void the policy, however, there are excep-
tions. If the insurer has actual knowledge of the 
truth or at least has sufficient indications that would 
have put a prudent man on notice and would have 
caused him to start an inquiry, which if carried out 
\vith reasonable thoroughness would reveal the truth, 
cannot blind himself to the true facts and used to N'-
ly on the misrepresentations.'' 
See Peterson v. ·Manhattan Life Insurance ·Company, 
91 N.E. 466. Here the insured answered a question in the 
negative when asked if he ·had been sick ·in the last ten 
years; ho\vever, in another part of the application it ·was 
clearly shown that he had malaria within this particular 
period of time, therefore, the ·Court held that the insur-
ance company had knowledge of the insured's physical con-
dition and said: 
''An insurance company cannot .insist upon forfeiture 
of an insurance policy for a cause of which it had 
knowledge when it issued the policy." 
In the instant case, even the misrepresentations the 
defendant contend that the .plaintiff made did not amount 
to fraud. Plaintiff cites to the Court questions 2 and 3 
set forth in Point II above. 
From the answers to .interrogatories, read in the light 
of the cases cited above, the respondent respectfully con-
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tends that there is no defense to the respondent's claim for 
paymenJt. The appellant does not contend fraud based up-
on its answers. 
POINT IV 
AN AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE GAINED WITHIN 
THE ORDINARY SCOPE O·F illS DUTIES WILL BE 
IMPUTED TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
The respondent contends that the appellant knew of 
the :physiCal condition of the insured, Harrod Wootton, and 
that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the appel-
lant. · The agent's knowledge is detailed in his deposition, 
page 3, line 23, to page 5, line 2. (R. 31) 
A-_ Utah case. dealing with this point is Farrington v. 
Granite State Fire Insurance Company of Portsmouth, et 
al., 232 P. 2d, 754. This action concerned -four identical 
fire insurance poJ.icies issued by the defendants to the 
plaintiff on the same building, which building was de- . 
stroyed by fire. The Court said: 
''The insuranee companies adopted and took the bene-
fits of all ihis conduct favorable to them. It seems 
. quite inconsistent for them to accept the advantages of 
everything he did for their benefit and yet insist that 
they are not responsible for the knowledge he acquired 
aJbout the building within the necessary and ordinary 
scope of ~his duties in handling the transaction. From 
the facts . stated he was their agent and they are 
charged with his lmowledge." 
'11he fact that an agent's knowledge ls his principal's 
knOwldge is particularly important when considered in re-
gard to the situation where the agent interviews the in-
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sured and fills in the application blank as he, the agent, 
asks qut."'Stions of the insured. Certainly, any knowledge 
of material fact which the agent gathers at this time will 
be imputed to the insurance company unless there is col-
lusion between the agent and the insured. 
See Turner v. Mutual Beneficial Health and Accident 
Association, 24 N.W. 2d, 534. Here an accident and 
health policy, which provided for a death benefit from ac-
cident, was issued to the insured. The agent, in filling out 
the application, merely asked questions of the insured and 
futnished answers from his own observation. The insur-
ance company now claims that false statements were made 
in the application, to-wit: The insured walked with a limp 
and had a short arm. The court held that no intent to de-
ceive was shown and that apparently the insured assumed 
that the agent understood the situation and that she was 
capable of filling out the application properly. There was 
some question as to whether the insured read the appli-
cation before signing it, thus the court said that even if 
the insured did read the application before signing it, he 
might logically conclude that the agent understood the in-
terpretation placed by the company on the questions in 
the application and thus have written them accordingly. 
The burden is on the insurance company to show intent 
to deceive. The court also said that the knowledge of the 
agent on a material matter required within the scope of 
the agent is imputed to the principal. 
See also annotation in 81 A.L.R., 833 and supplemen-
tal annotations in 117 A.L.R., 790 and 148 A.L.R., 507. 
This ruu1otation is entitled "Insertion by Insurer's Agent in 
Application of False Answers to Questions Correctly An-
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swered by Insured or Answers Suggested by Agent." In 
either situation the lmowledge of the agent is imputed to 
the insurer and, therefore, the insurer is unable to void 
the policy because of such false misrepresentations. 
The Utah Case of Bednarek v. Brothevhood of Ameri-
can Yeomen, 48 Utah, 67; 157 Pac., 884, is cited in sup-
port of this majority rule .. The annotation says: 
"The great weight of authority is that if an application 
for instu'ance is drawn by an agent of the insurer who 
fills in false answers to the interrogation contained 
therein which are truthfully answered by the insured 
without fraud, collusion or actual lmowledge of the 
insured or the eocistence of circumstances from which 
constructive ·knowledge of suoh falsity might be im-
puted to 'him, the insurer cannot rely upon the falsity 
of such answers in seeking to avoid liability under the 
policy issued upon the application." . 
Where the agent suggests answers or construes ques-
tions, the annotation says: 
"The act of the insurer's agent in assuming to interpret 
the questions in the application and to advise the in-
sured of the propriety or necessity of recording certain 
answers amounts to an interpretation of the questions 
and answers by the insurer himself~" 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully urges the Court · to sus-
tain the trial court's judgment. The respondent believes 
that there is no defense raised by the appellant's pleading; 
that there was in fact no misrepresentation; that the Urtah 
Statute excludes any miSrepresentation except that con-
tained in the application, and that a misrepresentation, to 
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l)(_• grolUlds for avoidance of an obligation must be material 
and amount to fraud, and that such must be pleaded with 
particularity as required by the Statute. Under the cir-
cwnstances of this case. the respondent respectfully sub-
mits that swnmary judgment is the appropriate relief. 
Respectfully' 
s/ Jackson B. Howard 
Jackson B. Howard, for 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
20 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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